Perceptions and sensations produced in parallel
In section 3.2.1 Ullman mentions Gibson'st heory that perceptions and sensations are produced in parallel by different processes. This could be true eveni fh is claim that both are "direct" results of external stimulation is false. Processes of perception can be distinguished from processes of sensation, namely becoming aware of the sorts of things usually referred to by philosophers as "sense-data", e.g. features and relations in the two-dimensional visual field, such as coloured patches and the elliptical appearance of circular objects viewed obliquely,e tc. Gibson was in part reacting to philosophers who claimed that perception involves inferences or constructions based on conscious processes of sensation. But normally the latter processes do not occur during perception: for instance if we are not painters or philosophers we may never notice anything elliptical, nor discern acute and obtuse corners, when we see a pennyonatable. It requires special training to become aware of the contents of the visual field, as opposed to the contents of the environment.
Thus Gibson was probably correct in saying that perception and sensation (that is, aw areness of sense-data) are independent processes, evenifhew as wrong in denying that either of them requires complexc onstructive (butu nconscious) processes. Theya re independent only in that each can occur without the other.O fc ourse, granting Gibson this point, not acknowledged explicitly by Ullman, does not undermine Ullman'so ther criticisms. The independence of the twoprocesses does not rule out their sharing manyunconscious "low-level" sub-processes of feature extraction, description, and interpretation. Thus theyc an be parallel without being 'direct' in anyinteresting sense.
Bewareofmathematically tractable special cases
In discussing the recovery of shape from motion (3.2.2), Ullman notes that when the human visual system is presented with a mathematically adequate though impoverished stimulus it will not always perceive the correct structure. He seems to interpret this as due to a failure of the visual system to pick up the available information, and he then launches into a discussion of physiological processes involved in registering properties of the optic array and producing binocular fusion.
But it is possible that the failure of the human visual system to use available information may not be due to a failure to pick up the information. Ullman does not, for instance, consider the possibility that human perception of moving shapes primarily uses mechanisms and strategies appropriate for non-rigid motion, such as changing facial expressions, a closing fist, or peel being pulled offab anana. This generally requires more information than rigid motion: and a failure to cope in the situations mentioned may be due to the fact that the mechanisms (or algorithms) require more information, event hough mathematically such information is not necessary for the perception of rigid motion. Of course, such a system would be able to cope with rigid motion as a special case, when provided with enough information, just as the ability to see curved lines and surfaces may enable straight and flat ones to be perceiveda ss pecial cases. Notice howf ew points are required mathematically for "perception" of these special cases: the fact that twopoints define a straight line may be of no use to a visual system that has to be able to decide whether the line is straight or curved.
So, an adequate analysis of the failure requires a fuller discussion of the difference between failing to pick up information and failing to use it. This note of scepticism concerning Ullman's theory of motion perception does not undermine his discussion of processes by which visual information is picked up. However, I suspect that anyaccount of perceptual processes which can readily be expressed in terms of physiological processes, without the need for higher level 'virtual processors' (see below) would be regarded by a Gibsonian as a theory of 'direct perception'. Stronger anti-Gibson arguments are needed.
One of my favourite anti-direct-perception demonstrations is the well-known example shown in figure 1:
Manypeople (the exact percentage is irrelevant), when first confronted with this can stare at it for several minutes without seeing anything wrong, despite repeated exhortations to look carefully. The failure to perceive the printed words correctly does not imply that there is anyf ailure in the lower levels of the visual system to pick up the relevant information. (It is interesting that some people discoverw hat is wrong spontaneously if asked to shut their eyes and count the words in the triangle. Theyo ften cannot say thereafter which occurrence of "THE" theyh ad previously seen.) Common observation of human abilities and inabilities suggests that there are many different levels and sub-processes in which things can go wrong, and a study of different sorts of perceptual errors can help to showj ust howw rong Gibson'st heory is. For instance, the 'doubletake' phenomenon (thinking you've seen X, then quickly and spontaneously realising it was Y after it has movedo ut of view) lends support to the extended Kantian theory sketched in chapter 9 of Sloman[1978] and Sloman and Owen[1980] that perception involves processing manyd omains of structure in parallel, with partial results in each domain constraining searches in others.
This organisation partly accounts for flexibility and graceful degradation in difficult circumstances, such as occluding objects, poor lighting, fog, intervening bushes, eye defects, and the like. A theory of direct perception cannot explain such abilities except by vacuous invocation of unspecifiable invariants, and invariant detectors with a magical ability to cope with noveland difficult circumstances.
If the visual system jumps to conclusions on the basis of both partial information and (for the sakeo fs peed) partial analysis at higher levels, this may normally work if the space of possible shapes is sparsely instantiated in the actual world: For example, not all shapes intermediate between a sheep and a horse, or a horse and a giraffe, are found. However, it requires the system to deployknowledge about which shapes are instantiated, in order to use the redundancyi nt he optic array.S ome sorts of perceptual mistakes suggest that we do indeed deploysuch knowledge. But that is inconsistent with anytheory that perception is direct.
Dropping out of consciousness
It is curious that Ullman has to rely (in section 5) on Schrodinger'sidea that processes perfected in the course of evolution drop out of consciousness. Isn'titacommonplace that manyprocesses perfected through painful individual learning drop out of consciousness --e.g. reading, playing a musical instrument, sight-reading music, following a spoor in a jungle, driving a car,p erceiving botanical or geological structures? To a suitably experienced person, these processes have the same subjective ease and immediacya st he simplest perceptions. The same is true of looking through a peephole at a static scene, where the lack of stereopsis, parallax, and optical flow causes ambiguities about relations between objects which cannot be resolved without prior knowledge. It is quite remarkable howlittle the absence of these ambiguity resolvers affects our perception of scenes involving familiar objects. Try,f or instance, covering and uncovering one eye, repeatedly,with your head quite still. Asmall peep-hole will help to eliminate information provided by accommodation and head movements.
Ullman seems to grant too much to Gibson. For despite the fact that the optic array in such cases contains an enormous amount of information (if lighting is good, fog and smokea re absent, etc.) it is still inherently ambiguous about occluded parts of objects and relative depths of separate objects. So the fact that we see a specific scene implies that we go beyond available information, contrary to Ullman'sc laim that ''the role of the processing is not to create information, but to extract it, integrate it, makeitexplicit and usable''.
Whyt his refusal to admit that creative inference plays a role in vision? I suspect that it arises out of a desire for theories concerned with mathematically tractable, unambiguous, information-extraction, which in turn is closely bound up with the methodological position Ullman derivesfrom Marr and Poggio. I shall criticise this in the next section.
All this suggests that it is no accident that we find the interpretation of paintings and drawings so easy: infants require no specialised training, because the processing of inherently ambiguous and impoverished information in the light of prior knowledge is a normal part of perception.
These facts seem to be more convincing than the example Ullman offers against Gibson, namely stereopsis (though his point about degrees of directness is a good one). As I've already suggested, Gibson might be happyt od escribe stereopsis as ''direct''i fb ased on the sorts of physiological mechanisms indicated by Ullman. Whyd oesn'tU llman use the more obvious and powerful arguments against direct perception? Is it related to his overall methodological position?
Aretherethree levels of understanding?
In section 5, following Marr and Poggio, Ullman sketches the methodological assumption that it is important to distinguish three levels of understanding: function, algorithm and mechanism. I think this assumption is confused and fails to acknowledge some important lessons from Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence. Moreover, itt hreatens to divert attention from difficult and messy problems in psychology to relatively simple mathematical problems.
First of all, the alleged top levelc annot be usefully separated from the levelo fa lgorithms and the study of representations. For instance, consider the favoured example of pure number theory: for centuries the specification of algorithmic processes (for finding factors, solving equations, and so on) has been central to the theory.T hat is the source of our concept of an algorithm! Further,the abstract properties of representations and operations on them have always been central to the theory of numbers, for instance the relationship between representing a number as a sum of powers of 10, a product of powers of primes, a sequence of applications of the successor function, and so on. Even the relationships between these abstract structures and algorithms and the more concrete notation-specific instantiations are very intimate. That is whys ome philosophers of mathematics have been tempted to analyse mathematics as concerned with nothing but formal manipulations of symbols. We see then that for number theory at least the distinction between the top leveland the levelofalgorithms breaks down completely.
Further,t he alleged distinction between algorithm and mechanism fails to takea ccount of the important notion of a ''virtual machine''. A physical mechanism (e.g. a calculator,o r computer,orbrain, perhaps) may instantiate a particular virtual machine which can be used as a basis for implementing other virtual machines (using programs which define operating systems, compilers, interpreters, and so on). There can be manyl ayers of different superimposed virtual machines, and the structure need not evenb eh ierarchic (if, for example, a relatively high level program is called as a subroutine from inside the microcode of a computer). Compare Sloman [1978, chs 1,6,10] .
Manyofthe most important issues in AI have been concerned with the study of trade-offs between different virtual machines for a particular function, such as trade-offs between space and time, efficiencya nd flexibility,e fficiencya nd modularity,c ompleteness and speed, clarity and robustness. It is possible that such computational trade-offs are the key tom uch of the complexity of human and animal psychology,and ultimately neurophysiology.Ifso, it may be a serious impediment to scientific progress to advocate an oversimple methodological stance. The calculator example of section 5, for instance, is dangerously misleading, because the rigidity of function of a typical calculator makes it unnecessary for our understanding of it to involve consideration of manylayers of implementation or the kinds of trade-offs and mixtures of levels found in human psychology.Bycontrast, when we study human arithmetical expertise (acquired after manyy ears of individual learning), most of the mathematical theory of numbers is an irrelevant digression. Instead we have toc onsider issues of storing many' partial results', indexing them, linking them to methods of recognising situations where theya re applicable, associating them with monitoring processes for detecting slips and mistakes, etc. (Sloman 1978, chapter 7.) Similar issues arise in the study of human expertise in producing and understanding a natural language: instead of a mathematically elegant formal grammar,atypical speaker seems to use a huge collection of not completely consistent partial rules and heuristics for deploying them. Ibelieve that this is an inevitable consequence of the need for rapid performance, and reliability in circumstances with varying amounts of noise and degradation of sentences produced by other speakers. The same messy kind of complexity would characterise much of visual perception, for much the same reason, evenifthe lowest levels of the visual system, discussed by Ullman, are an exception, embodying knowledge which can be safely compiled into ''hardware''b ecause the physics and geometry of light and manysorts of surfaces are constant in all visual environments. Va riable aspects of the environment will need to be dealt with in a different way,m ediated by considerable individual learning.
In short, Neisser'sunease with ''processing and still more processing'', quoted approvingly by Ullman (in section 5), may in fact turn out to be unease with a central feature of human psychology.
Is subjective experience a complete mystery?
In section 5 Ullman claims that experience isa mystery,d espite recent attempts to remove the mystery (e.g. Dennett [1979] and chapter 10 of my [1978] ), to say nothing of the much older paper by Minsky[1968] .
Important steps have been taken by work in AI, showing howi np rinciple internal processes can occur which reflect some of the phenomenological structure of visual subjective experiences --for example the experience of certain things forming a totality,ofone thing being above another,ofanedge appearing convex orconcave.O fcourse this work is in its infancy, but it is so far ahead of anything previously available that to say we are still faced with a ''complete mystery''ismisleading.
Fori nstance, we can nowb egin to see howo ther aspects of subjective experiences can be accounted for within the computational/representational approach. The phenomenology of emotional states such as anger,terror or embarrassment requires the use of additional computing concepts, such as priorities, resource allocation, and interrupts. Toi llustrate: a characteristic of heated emotional states, such as anger or embarrassment, is that attempts to think about something else constantly fail, suggesting that a process of resource allocation is using something likepriorities and interrupts. I am currently engaged in a more detailed study of such experiences in collaboration with a research student, Monica Croucher.I ti si mportant that in a journal such as this the claim that subjective experience remains a complete mystery should not go unchallenged. However, this is not the time for a more detailed discussion. It is worth noting that there will always be a residual area of moral disagreement overw hether the mystery has been removed, since for example the question whether a robot has subjective experiences is in part a question of howitought to be treated. Disagreements of that sort, whether concerned with machines, animals or people, cannot be eradicated by science or logic.
